17 March 1982

Centralized Review and Personnel (II)

SUPPORT -- Upon receipt of manuscript and CRD handling:

- 1. Receipt by secretary
 - a. Log in.
 - b. Forward to CRD management for assessment and assigning.
 - c. After assignment, forward to clerical.
- 2. Receipt by <u>clerical</u> for necessary duplication (NOTE: Individual manuscripts may be from one or two pages to 500-600 pages, one or two volumes, etc.)
 - a. Copy for manuscript (individual) file (can be original); 2 copies for reviewers; copy for possible alternate reviewer and/or CRD management.
 - b. Other Duties
 - (1) Copies of following on <u>each</u> manuscript for the file and copies for distribution to the PRB:
 - (a) Copies of manuscript worksheet.
 - (b) Copies of all pages marked for deletion.
 - (c) Attachment of the log justifying deletion actions.
 - (d) Attachment of research done.
 - (e) Attachment detailing coordination and results.
 - (f) A recommended action for PRB to consider.
 - (g) Comments or information to be given to requester.
 - (2) Link to Copy Center (for huge manuscripts).

REVIEW (Copy in hand of each reviewer):

- 1. The review by the reviewers:
 - a. Reviewers receive assignment from CRD management.

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- b. Read the correspondence on the manuscript forwarded from OGC.
- c. Attend first to ambiguities and discrepancies (timing of request and problems, deadline difficulties, partial text, missing pages, illegible copy or pages, etc.).
- d. Review the manuscript -- clear, mark for deletion or identify material to be assessed, footnoted, coordinated, discussed with CRD management, etc -research as necessary (components, data systems, books, journals, professional discussion) -- arrange for mid- and final meeting with CRD management.
- e. For each manuscript being reviewed, prepare copy of manuscript review worksheet, identify all pages marked for deletion, attachment of log justifying deletion actions, attachment of all research done and its results, attachment on coordination and results, recommended action for PRB, and any comments, information or suggestions to requester.
- f. Forward results of e. (above) parts (in succession) or a complete package at one time via secretary to clerical for copying and preparation of manuscript and complete review package for PRB meeting (as outlined in "Other Duties" clerical).

SUPPORT TO PRB:

- 1. CRD management examines manuscript and final review package for the PRB, meets with reviewers and prepares correspondence for forwarding the manuscript and review package to PRB Chairman and PRB members.
- 2. CRD secretary types covering correspondence and forwards signed correspondence, manuscript and review package to PRB Chairman.

POST PRB ACTION:

- 1. Upon final decisive action by PRB on a manuscript (approve total release, total or partial denial) CRD will prepare the manuscript and the PRB decision for return to the requester via OGC.
- 2. If immediate further review, research or clarification is necessary after a PRB meeting, the manuscript should be logged in again by the secretary, CRD management alerted, and the manuscript given back to the original reviewers (along with the proper correspondence) and the reviewers will recycle a part of or the entire review process in CRD to get the manuscript further reviewed and back to the PRB as requested for final decision.
- 3. Any other PRB holds, OGC holds, or other directorate or component holds will be handled by those units and the PRB until the manuscript is either ready for clearance or to be sent back to CRD for further review. In this case the manuscript will be handled as in 2 (above) by CRD.



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	PERSONNEL:
STAT	1.
	a. CRD office work.
	b. Manuscript work (review).
	c. FRUS work (review).
	d. NARS and DOD work (review).
STAŢ	2.
	a. Manuscript work.
	b. Back-up to Secretary.
•	c. General CRD work.
STAT	3. NOTE: also gives CRD credible STAT review power in areas of geography, operations, substance, experience, breath of coverage and effort for a full year's work (absence, vacations, unforeseen events))
TAT	a. manuscript review team.
	b. manuscript review team.
	c. (for assignment to fill a review team at any time and for any reason; back-up to review team on all parts of the review process review, research, coordination, comparative review, correspondence, meetings, liaison, etc.; third party expertise and opinion on review decisions.
	d. Reviewer Time on an average of 4 manuscripts a week. (NOTE: This will take 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week for each reviewer.) ostimate is based one 40-hour week.) (1) 3.2 Hours (40%) review and further review.
	(2) 2.8 Hours (35%) research, coordination, clarification, appeals, correction, comparative (review) and follow-up.
	(3) 1.2 hours (15%) manuscript review worksheet, marking pages for deletion, logging actions, preparing attachments on actions, preparation of comments and collection of information (from coordination, research,

discussion with CRD management, etc.).

CRD management, correspondence, meetings.

(4) .4 Hours (5%) -- additional time with secretary, clerical,



STAT

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(5) .4 Hours (5%) -- review and further review emergencies and unexpected events, planning next day's work and next week's work procedures, scheduling, lost time on repeat actions and calls.

- 4. (automation production control specialist)
- a. Compiles and maintains the central record base for the Agency of the release status of sensitive and/or classified information.
- b. Tracking service to CRD reviewers (and others) for manuscript classification review.
 - c. Liaison with other Agency data base systems.

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

18 March 1982

Centralized Reviewers: Personnel (III)

- 1. At the moment we in CRD should recognize that in filling the probable four or five slots for reviewers in generalized review that we will be asking for, we now have approxiamtely six well-qualified people. Two or three of them are actually eligible to retire now (near future) or within the next year (starting right now).
- 2. Out of the next three most likely candidates for a centralized reviewer slot, one is already retired and another may retire when he chooses.
- 3. In recruiting for other centralized reviewers, we will have to start looking right now. All of these candidates will have to have something like 15-20 years with the Agency, an active good working record, and people who are well-rounded generalists. (Specialists will not do if you are dealing with only four or five slots to get the Agency review work done.) The centralized review team members have to be top-notch people.
- 4. They will also have to be well read, well travelled, articulate and well informed. They will have to be good at liaison and coordination. Perhaps even more central will be the way they can root out, dig, and come up with answers, not just hunches, thoughts or beliefs and opinions -- in other words, solid research and well written.

NOTE: CRD is no longer going to have the luxury of saying we didn't have time to research a point which CRD brought up in a review -- we are going to be the research and (on the points identified or suspect) have to come up with the authoritative answers. Therefore, CRD will really have to zero in on the tools of this research. We will have to track down executive disclosure, public domain, prior release, literature published and journal printings. We will also have to come up with the logic and rational for items identified and located by research but which we still want the Agency to hold. In some ways this is a tall order. It has been done by others and by other units in review work, but remember this was usually a tailored thing that came up just now and then for anyone involved and they usually controlled all the circumstances.

CRD will be at the point for all of the Agency and these situations will be coming at us with rapid fire and regularly. There will not be much of a breather for anyone involved, perhaps even after it all shakes down and a track record is established.

In 70.80% of motances We do not need 2 reviewers in the initial reading. This would be very inefficient and would not be much of an imperiment over present set-up. a seemed reader may be necessary in Some cases, however, but the first reverier can more His determination after starting his review

Statement of the Problem

- 1. The Agency's systematic classification review program was first established in ***temperental 1972 in response to Executive Order (E.O.) 11652 and expanded in scope in response to succeeding Executive orders. Experience has demonstrated that the Agency has expended considerable sums and manpower over the years with little return for *** money in terms of the quantity of classified materials declassified and released to the public -- the objective of the orders. Further, the burden of

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1. Systematic Review

a. How much material qualifies?

b. What material is it?

c. Will the Directorate approve?

2. Manuscripts

A. We will get a few over 200 this year.

b. Personnel requirement well expand because:

I. Review will be for entire agency.

II. More research and coordination will be necessary.

II. May have to help with recording release late

3. Department of State

a. FRUS

b. Participation in review of FRUS supplemented

c. State records review project to

protect CIA information.

4. NARS

a, Coordinated review of State 1950-59
records,
b. Systematic review (limited) at NARS
and Suitland,
c. Presidential Lebranes


5. DOD

a. To review histories, documents uncovered in DOD's systematic review program, manuscripts.

I. Work on histories should increase.

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LOGIC FOR CENTRAL REVIEW OF MANUSCRIPTS



101 000.01	ONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED		
Approved For Release 2005/07/28 : CIA-RDPS	33B01194R001200100006-2 TSC No. :		
	Request No.:		
	Part of		
Return to:	Document Identification		
•	Item No. (If applicable): Document Description:		
Information and Privacy Staff	Document Description.		
Room 2E-42, Headquarters Building			
REVIEW WORKSHEET	Expendable Copy: Yes		
(Do not detach from document)	Expendable Copy: Yes		
PART I. Findings and Recommendations			
be obtained from the following CI	and/or release. Clearances should A components or agencies of the o further clearances are required):		
b. Declassification is impossible at provisions of E.O. 12065, 1-301, (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) an explanation of these provision of this information could reasons identifiable damage to the nation classification guide citations ar	are (circle one or more) . (See back of form for s.) The unauthorized disclosure bly be expected to cause al security. The appropriate		
c. (Do not use this portion of form requests referred to the Agency for The document must be withheld, in the exemption provisions of FOIA (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (Go to PART II.)	whole or in part, pursuant to subsections (circle one or more):		
PART II. Sanitization			
a. Sanitization is impossible or ins	dvisable.		
b. Sanitized version may be released provided that certain information is excised. (If "Expendable Copy," bracket material to be deleted in red If not an "Expendable Copy," indicate material to be deleted in the space below, citing page, paragraph, line etc. Use continuation sheet if needed.) Release of segregable portions must be cleared with the following CIA components or agencies of the U.S. Government (leave blank if no further clearances are required):			
	Reviewer		
Downgraded to	Name or Employee No.		
when detached	Component		
	Date of Review		
TOP SECRET SECRET	ONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED		
FORM 3724 USE PREVIOUS (Rev. 2-79)			

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Classification Requirements, 1-3, Executive Order 12065

- 1-301. Information may not be considered for classification unless it concerns:
 - (a) military plans, weapons, or operations;
 - (b) foreign government information;
 - (c) intelligence activities, sources or methods;
 - (d) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- (e) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
- (f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; or
- (g) other categories of information which are related to national security and which require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by the President, by a person designated by the President pursuant to Section 1-201, or by an agency head. (See your Directorate's classification guide for the categories of information so designated by the DCI.)

Classification Guide Citations

We no longer are required to mark documents being returned to Presidential Libraries to conform with the provisions of the Executive order currently in force. We ask that you indicate the applicable classification guide provisions, however, in order to pinpoint the precise reasons why the classification of each document must be retained. This determination must be made by an Agency official who has been delegated either original or derivative classification authority.

A few of the DDO classification guide categories which presumably will often be applicable are listed below:

- D9a.2 Foreign weapons, (Review 20 years)
- D9b.1 Foreign liaison information (Review 30 years)
- D9c.1 Sources (Review 20 years)
- D9c.3 Stations (Review 20 years)
- D9c.4 Identities of CIA personnel, code designation, etc. (Review 20 years)
- D9c.5 Cover agreements between the CIA and other government agencies (Review 20 years)
- D9c.9 Sigint (Review 20 years)
- D9c.12 Official and non-official cover, when cover organization is identified (Review 20 years)
- D9c.13 Identification of CIA personnel under official cover, when cover organization is not identified (Review 20 years)
- D9d.2 Impair the conduct of U.S. foreign policies (Review 20 years)
- D9d.4 Plans (Review 20 years)
- D9d.5 Activities conducted abroad (Review 20 years)
- D9d.6 Information revealing that the United States has obtained or seeks to obtain data concerning a foreign nation which could adversely affect U.S. foreign relations (Review 20 years)